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THE BIMAS PROGRAM FOR SELF-SUFFICIENCY 
IN RICE PRODUCTION*
Alexis Rieffel
BIMAS is a system of agricultural extension, 
planned and on a mass scale, that aims to raise 
agricultural production, and at the same time 
to increase the prosperity of farmers (specifi­
cally) and of society (in general)--all in the 
context of building a just and prosperous society 
based on Pantjasila, by the will of God.
Soedarsono Hadisapoetro, 1967
In 1964, faced with the fundamental problem of population 
growth that was substantially more rapid than the growth of 
food production, and moved for reasons of nationalism to strive 
for self-sufficiency, Indonesia gambled on a "home-grown" solu­
tion: the BIMAS program.* 1 In the short space of three years,
a small-scale pilot project was transformed into a "united- 
front” assault on traditional patterns of rice production in 
virtually every rice-growing district in the nation. Although 
the success of the program to date has not been extraordinary, 
it is worth examining both as a type of approach to the basic 
problem of "agricultural transformation," and as an example of 
IndonesiaTs capacity to undertake programs of national develop­
ment .
The immediate objective of BIMAS is the straightforward 
one of increasing production, of rice in this case. It has a 
three-pronged approach which presents to the farmer: (1) an
"ideology" of modern rice farming; (2) credit to purchase a 
"package" of modern inputs; and (3) intensive guidance. The
* The field research for this study, undertaken from May to
September 1968, was made possible by the International Devel­
opment Studies Program, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 
Tufts University.
1. The acronym "BIMAS" is from bimbingan massal, mass guidance. 
It is reasonable to suspect that BIMAS was inspired to some 
extent by the agricultural programs of Mainland China, al­
though no direct evidence of such influence is available. 
BIMAS also resembles, in some respects, the "package program" 
initiated in India under the guidance of the Ford Foundation, 
but again, there is no evidence that the "package program" 
approach was emulated by the originators of BIMAS.
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first component is the ideology of pantja usaha (five endeavors): 
proper soil preparation; proper irrigation; use of improved seed 
varieties; use of fertilizer; and use of pesticides. The second 
is the BIMAS package, consisting of a sufficient amount of 
credit (channeled through the village-level agricultural cooper­
atives) to obtain the necessary seed, fertilizer and pesticides. 
Third is mass guidance, a concentrated effort by local agents 
of the Agricultural Extension Service, supplemented by university 
students, to spread the meaning of pantja usaha and to ensure 
delivery of the package elements "to the right place at the 
right time."
The pantja usaha has been the most effective and the 
cooperative-administered credit package the least effective com­
ponent. For Indonesian society in the long run, however, the 
involvement of students may be the most significant aspect of 
BIMAS.
The Origin and Expansion of BIMAS2
No important efforts in the field of agricultural extension 
were made in Indonesia before the Revolution. The first program 
of note following Independence was the establishment of Rural
2. Published material on BIMAS in the English language includes, 
among others: Asian Development Bank, Report of the Technical
Assistance Mission to Indonesia to Advise on the Production 
and Availability of Foodstuffs in Indonesia, 2 Vols., (Manila, 
December 30, 1967) LRestricted]; Asian Development Bank,
Report of the Technical Assistance Mission to Survey and 
Advise on the Indonesian Rural Credit System, 2 Vols. CManila, 
December 13, 1968) LRestrictedJ; Government of Indonesia, 
Indonesian Science Institute (LIPI), Draft Report of the NAS- 
LIPI Workshop on Food, Djakarta, 27 May - 1 June 1968, 2 Vols. 
(Djakarta) LMimeographedJ; International Bank for Reconstruc- 
tion and Development, International Development Association, 
Economic Development of Indonesia, 6 Vols. (February 12, 1968) 
[RestrictedJ; Leon Mears and Saleh Afiff, "A New Look at the 
BIMAS Program and Rice Production in Indonesia," Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies, No. 10 (June 1968), pp. 29-47;
D . H. Penny, ’^ Agricultural Extens ion for the Masses," BIES,
No. 2 (September 1965), pp. 60-63; E. A. Roekasah and D. H. 
Penny, "BIMAS: A New Approach," BIES, No. 7 (June 1967), pp.
60-69; United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, 
Report of the FAQ Survey Team to Indonesia, 23 January - 23 
February 1967 (Djakarta: reprinted by DIrektorat Pertanian" 
Rakj at, 19 6 8 ) .
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Education Centers (Balai Pendidikan Masjarakat Desa> or BPMD).
The BPMD were to be focal points of a broad range of develop- 
ment activities; the original intention was to establish one in 
each ketjamatan (sub-district) in the country. But the costs 
of purchasing land and constructing and equipping a facility 
were much higher than anticipated, and, as of 1968, BPMD existed 
in barely twelve percent of Indonesia’s ketjamatan.3 4
The next noteworthy effort was made soon after the transi­
tion to Guided Democracy/Economy. Emergency Law #16 of 1959 
established a Board for Food Production and Land Development.
The board can claim one accomplishment: the establishment, by
1961, of 500 Paddy Centers (Padi Sentra)1* which provided ferti­
lizer, improved seeds, and production credit to rice farmers. 
Repayment was in kind at the end of each season. Unfortunately, 
the Padi Sentra failed. Credit was so easy to get that the 
farmers did not feel compelled to repay it; the low price set 
for rice in repayment of credit was a negative production incen­
tive; and the personnel operating the centers were insufficiently 
trained relative to the large number of tasks they were expected 
to perform.5 The Padi Sentra program was officially terminated 
in 1964.
The year 1959 is also notable for the inauguration of the 
Three-Year Rice Production Plan, a massive effort to achieve 
self-sufficiency in rice by importing fertilizer and organizing 
the petani (peasants) to increase their production. A national 
command was established to oversee the program (Komando Operasi 
Gerakan Makmur, or KOGM); at the village level, executive bodies 
were formed to coordinate the work of the petani who were all 
(in theory) organized into ten-man teams. One innovation in 
this scheme was that it combined efforts to deliver the inputs 
necessary to expand production with efforts to "change the men­
tality of the farmer."6 The scheme failed because it was too
3. In 1968, 371 BPMD: see: Rapat Kerdja Pangan 1968, Masalah
Institutionil, Working Paper No. 5 (Djakarta, 1968), p. 8; 
3164 ketjamatan in 1955, according to Nugroho, Indonesia: 
Facts and Figures (Djakarta: n.p., 1967), p. 33. In the 
current five-year plan, the existing BPMD will be improved.
4. Reportedly, the Paddy Center program was based on the Philip­
pines1 success with a similar institution. United States 
Economic Survey Team to Indonesia, Indonesia: Perspective
and Proposals for United States Economic Aid (New Haven:
Yale Southeast Asia Program, 1963).
5. Soedarsono Hadisapoetro, Bimbingan Massal Sebagai Sistem 
Penjuluhan Pertanian (Jogjakarta, 1967), p. 6T
6. Djatianto Kretosastro, BIMAS S.S.B.M. (Djakarta, 1962), p. 7.
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diffused: this was "guided extension" parallel to Sukarno’s
Guided Democracy; but the number of qualified leaders was in­
sufficient to exert the leverage necessary to approach the 
objectives of the plan; and it proved impossible to coordinate 
delivery of inputs on such a massive scale.
In the early 1960 !s, then, great concern was directed 
toward increasing rice production (for political as well as 
economic reasons), but considerable disillusionment about the 
possibilities existed, considering the blatant failure of all 
previous efforts. Obviously, new ideas were required. The 
Agricultural Institute in Bogor (hereafter referred to as IPB, 
from Institut Pertanian Bogor, the name adopted in 1963 when it 
separated from the University of Indonesia), in keeping with 
its position as the best agricultural faculty in Indonesia at 
that time, developed the new initiatives. Nevertheless, this 
involvement of the college in agricultural extension in 1963 
represented a departure from IPB’s past traditions. In the 
first place, very few of its students came from rural back­
grounds, and second, no more than one month of the five-year 
curriculum was devoted to village-level work because graduates 
rarely became extension officers. The bulk of BogorTs graduates 
went to work in the Agricultural Ministry or on the estates 
(plantations).
The pilot project for the BIMAS concept, located in the 
Karawang District east of Djakarta, was proposed by an instructor 
at IPB and sponsored by the Ministry of Education. How did it 
happen that the Ministry of Education, rather than the Ministry 
of Agriculture, sponsored this first attempt? Briefly, it is 
because a few individuals were strategically placed at the 
proper time, in particular, Prof. Dr. Ir. Tojib Hadiwidjaja, 
the present Minister of Agriculture and former Dean of the 
Faculty at IPB, who became Minister of Education in March 1962. 
The Law on Higher Education of 1961 (No. 22) had listed service 
to society as a third "duty of higher education," in addition 
to the traditional duties of teaching and research. As Educa­
tion Minister, Prof. Tojib created an institute to supervise the 
universities in their implementation of the "third duty"--the 
Lembaga Koordinasi Pengabdian Masjarakat (LKPM), Coordinating 
Institute for Service to Society. At the same time, Ir.
Djatianto Kretosastro, a lecturer in the Agronomy Department at 
IPB, had conceived of a new approach to agricultural extension 
based on the principle of intensive guidance. He presented it 
to a conference sponsored by the Agriculture Ministry in July 
1963, but the response there was not encouraging. Therefore, 
he turned to LKPM, where his proposal was received enthusiasti­
cally.
Although there is no room here to develop a case supporting 
the contention, it appears that the imaginative action which 
produced the BIMAS program was in response to the nationalist 
fervor of the period. Confrontation with Malaysia had begun in
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December 1962; the growing strength of the Communist Party (PKI) 
was alarming the traditional power structure; Sukarno was ex­
horting his people to greater efforts by invoking the spirit of 
Marhaen— the mythical peasant who symbolized the rural masses. 
Despite a tendency to remain aloof from the peasantry, the 
elite, which automatically includes all university students and 
graduates, felt under pressure to demonstrate positively its 
support of the Pantjasila (Five Basic Principles of the State) 
ideology. The BIMAS program answered this need.
Pilot Projek Pantja Usaha Lengkap, 
Karawang, 1963/1964
Ir. Djatianto!s proposed new approach to agricultural 
extension was tested in the field during the 1963/1964 wet sea­
son (on Java, roughly November through May). It was known as 
the nComplete Pantja Usaha Pilot Project” because its hypothesis 
stated that the most promising route to increased rice produc­
tion involved assisting the petani in cultivating according to 
pantja usaha. To paraphrase Ir. DjatiantoTs description, it 
was a form of "action-research" designed to channel (in a con­
centrated manner) new ideas and techniques to farmers in order 
to increase their awareness and thus make them self-supporting.
In the socio-economic field, the Project would lay the ground­
work for effective koperta (agricultural cooperatives) and 
determine costs of production, costs of living, and credit 
needs. In the educational field, it would provide practical 
training for agriculture students on the one hand and introduce 
science to the rural areas on the other.7
Twelve students, in their fourth or fifth years at IPB, 
were selected to participate in the Project. They received 
special training before arriving at their sites, in mid-September 
1963, and they remained in the Project’s three villages until 
the harvest. Altogether, the Pilot Project encompassed 162 cul­
tivators (thirteen per student) and 103 hectares (eight per 
student). In each village, the yields of the participants ex­
ceeded six tons of dry stalk padi per hectare. Compared with 
the yields of non-participants, the Pilot Project results ranged 
from 40% to 145% higher, depending on the village.
In the principal account of the Karawang Project, Ir. 
Djatianto stated that the doubling or tripling of yields achieved 
by the Project "proved" that the approach adopted was correct.8 
Due to methodological shortcomings, however, the subsequent 
written records do not support the claim. How, then, did the
7. Djatianto, BIMAS, pp. 56-70.
8. Ibid., p. 12.
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Karawang Project become the springboard for a nation-wide pro­
gram? The best guess is that Ir. Djatianto was the right sales­
man with the right product in the right place at the right time. 
He was imaginative enough to draw on his experience with the 
Project to.formulate a logical expansion of the technique which 
could be applied on a nation-wide basis, and he knew where to 
take his idea.
Demonstrasi Massal, 1964/1965
The transformation of Ir. Djatiantofs concept from a pilot 
project to a nation-wide program took place within a matter of 
months. The crucial point of transition came in September 1964 
during the annual working meeting of the provincial heads of the 
Agricultural Extension Service in Djakarta. Before discussing 
the proceedings of this meeting, one needs to explain the dis­
tinction between the national and the provincial extension 
services, and to describe how they are related to the Agriculture 
Ministry.
Consistent with the administrative structure of the Indone­
sian Government, each province has an autonomous agricultural 
extension service known as Diperta (Dinas Fertanian Rakjat,
Office of People’s Agriculture, as distinct from Estate Agricul­
ture). Each Diperta provincial head is appointed by the pro­
vince’s governor and is fully responsible for the implementation 
of agricultural extension within his province. The national 
extension service is responsible for drawing up and funding 
national programs and for providing the provincial services 
with the technical information and material necessary to fulfill 
their responsibilities. The national extension service was 
known as Djaperta (Djawatan Fertanian Rakjat, Service for 
People’s Agriculture) until 1965. Subsequently, it was brought 
directly into the Ministry of Agriculture as the Direktorat 
Fertanian Rakjat (Dirtara, Directorate of People’s Agriculture) 
under the Agriculture Department.
Troubled by the earlier failures to achieve self-sufficiency 
in rice production, the Agriculture Ministry in 1963 was groping 
for a new approach. In July of that year, the Ministry spon­
sored a conference of graduates from the agriculture faculties 
in order to get some ideas for a new system of agricultural ex­
tension. This meeting declined to consider Ir. Djatianto’s 
original proposal.
At approximately the same time each year, a working meeting 
is called by Dirtara for all the Diperta heads in order to review 
the previous year’s production, check progress in the current 
year, and plan the coming year’s programs. In the 1963 meeting, 
in September, the Agriculture Ministry decided that any new rice 
production campaign must be concentrated in areas with the best
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potential for production increases and also must be administered 
through the koperta. In December 1963, Djaperta invited repre­
sentatives of the agriculture faculties and representatives of 
the peasant mass organizations to a seminar called to draw up a 
new agricultural extension system. Their conclusions became 
official policy. Two of them are translated below to illustrate 
the spirit of the endeavor.9
a. The peasant class, which at this time faces 
difficulties in the socio-economic field and delays 
in the education field, consequently needs special 
attention in order to create a favorable climate that 
will stimulate the passion for work in raising the 
production of important crops.
b. The seminar emphasizes the need for a basic 
change in agricultural extension (in its objectives 
as well as its method and organization) so that agri­
cultural extension will in fact fulfill its role as a 
tool of the Revolution.
Finally, by the annual working meeting of the extension 
services in September 1964, the preceding fourteen months of 
debate had produced a new national program to increase rice pro­
duction. The details resulted from a special committee set up 
to formulate a program to involve students in agricultural ex­
tension. Representatives of all the agencies concerned with 
agricultural development participated in the discussions, in­
cluding the social service institute LKPM of the Department 
of Higher Education, the eight agricultural faculties, the 
Farmers1 and Fishermen’s Cooperative Bank (Bank Koperasi Tani 
dan NeZajan--BKTN, now known as BNI Unit II), the National 
Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives (INDUK KOPERTA), and 
the State Fertilizer Trust (P.N. Pertani). The special committee 
discussions focused on a working paper submitted by the leader 
of the Karawang Pilot Project, Ir. Djatianto. Rather than being 
a simple review of the Karawang Project, however, this working 
paper set forth detailed guidelines for the implementation on a 
large scale of a new kind of extension approach. In fact, 
Djatianto’s presentation was so well prepared that his plan was 
accepted virtually in toto. One minor departure was an acreage 
target of 11,000 rather than 10,000 hectares. Significantly, 
however, it was decided to locate DEMAS (Demonstrasi Massal, Mass 
Demonstration) units in fifteen of Indonesia’s provinces, rather 
than restricting them to Java’s three provinces as suggested by 
Djatianto. It was also agreed at the working meeting that the 
administrative costs of DEMAS would be shared by the Department 
of Higher Education and Dirtara. BKTN agreed to provide cash 
credit to the participating petani through the koperta, and P.N. 
Pertani along with the Diperta undertook to sell inputs to the 
petani through the koperta.
9 . Ibid., p. 11.
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Because of the crucial nature of this working paper, it is 
worth reviewing here briefly.10 Djatianto entitled his paper 
"A Plan for Mass Demonstration for Self-Sufficiency in Food­
stuff s!t (Rentjana Demonstrasi Massal, SSBM). He began with the 
assertion that extension conducted in an intensive manner, as 
tested in the Karawang Project, could potentially double or 
triple rice yields. Experience indicated that the largest effec­
tive unit of intensification was 50 hectares with two students 
guiding about 100 farmers. Because the number of final-year 
agriculture students in Indonesia’s eight agricultural faculties 
was only 4-00, this limited the number of intensification units 
to 200, covering 10,000 hectares.
Ir. Djatianto outlined three sets of prerequisites for the 
success of DEMAS; they governed the choice of areas in which to 
carry out DEMAS, the conditions which students and other DEMAS 
workers must fulfill, and the equipment and materials. Concern­
ing the choice of areas, Ir. Djatianto distinguished between 
the technical/physical prerequisites including high-yield-poten­
tial factors (fully-technical irrigation, infrastructure, 
locally-proven seed varieties and cultivation methods) plus 
risk-reduction factors (flood-free and disease-free plots) and 
the social prerequisites, including cultivator-owned land and 
freedom from the negative influence of cities. The prerequisites 
for the students and other workers were (to paraphrase the work­
ing paper):
a. A strong mentality: willingness to sacrifice,
desire to help society, consciousness of the meaning 
of the Message of the People’s Suffering and of the 
third goal of the Indonesian Revolution (a just and 
prosperous society), proper conduct (i.e., total inte­
gration of thought, feeling and action) with the petani 
participating.
b. Technical knowledge: practical, not just
theoretical, knowledge of soil cultivation and all 
stages of rice production; also general knowledge 
about agriculture and village sociology.
c. Strong and healthy physique: capable of
assisting the petani in all his tasks for up to four­
teen hours per day.
In the last part of his working paper, Ir. Djatianto drew 
up a detailed schedule for implementing DEMAS:
10. Ibid., pp. 123-145 for complete text.
Ill
A, Preparation for DEMAS
1. DEMAS Command Structure
DEMAS is a cooperative program including all the 
institutions involved in agriculture. On the highest 
level, the program is directed by a committee composed 
of the directors of all the institutions concerned.
The program is carried out by an Executive Committee 
headed by the Director of Dirtara, and includes repre­
sentatives of all institutions concerned. At the pro­
vincial level, DEMAS is administered by the Deans of 
the Agricultural Faculties in the province and the 
head of the respective Diperta along with representa­
tives of BKTN (for credit) and P. N. Pertani (for 
fertilizer). At the kabupaten level, similar groups 
are formed, and at the unit level, the program is run 
by the local extension agent, the students assigned 
to the unit and various local leaders.
2. Local Extension Organization
Everyone concerned at the local level must par­
ticipate in decision-making. The koperta, however, 
is the focal point of all efforts.
3. Coaching
Practice is as important as theory for all DEMAS 
workers (students, extension agents, etc.). One month 
of coaching will be given for all workers before 
starting the program.
4. Preparation of Material and Equipment
Equipment for workers (uniforms, notebooks, guide 
manuals), materials for cultivation (seeds, fertilizer, 
pesticides, tools), and extension materials (bicycles, 
films, pamphlets) must be available on site before 
they are needed.
B. Implementation of DEMAS
Workers must arrive at the unit one month before 
seeding. On site, workers must acquaint themselves 
with the locality and draw up a master plan for the 
season. Indoctrination of farmers must be scheduled. 
The workers must learn to adjust their behavior to 
local expectations. An inventory of material needs 
must be completed. The activities of the koperta must 
be monitored. Each worker must personally prepare a 
one-half to one hectare demonstration plot. All 
effective methods of extension must be utilized.
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C. Evaluation of DEMAS
At the end of the season, a thorough evaluation 
of the program must be undertaken.
Considering that the working meeting at which the DEMAS 
program was adopted adjourned in the middle of September when 
planting for the wet season rice crop was beginning in many 
areas, the speed with which the program was implemented is re­
markable. The number of units actually set up matched the tar­
get. Even more significant, the yield increases in DEMAS ex­
ceeded the yield increases attained in the Karawang Project: 
the average yield for DEMAS plots was seven tons of dry stalk 
padi per hectare compared with three tons for non-DEMAS control 
plots.
At least in Central Java, the success of the program was 
due in large measure to the nationalist fervor of the students 
who participated in it. At the beginning of September 1964, 
the students at Universitas Gadjah Mada organized a conference 
to summarize the previous year’s efforts and to prepare the next 
group of students for the second year of the program. To illus­
trate the spirit of the period, a few excerpts from the proceed­
ings of the conference are offered here. The conference actually 
was sponsored by the Agriculture Faculty (Gadjah Mada) Company 
of the Jogjakarta Students’ Regiment, and it had three themes:11
1. To integrate the Jogjakarta Students’ Regiment 
with the society to carry out Amanat Takari by raising 
food production through BIMAS S.S.B.M.
2. To implement the Five Foundations of the Revo­
lution, with BIMAS S.S.B.M. in order to carry out the 
Message of the People’s Suffering.
3. To be successful in standing on our own two 
feet in the field of food production— thereby ensuring 
the victory of NEFOS [New Emerging Forces] over OLDEFOS 
[Old Established Forces].
The students designated their effort ’’Operation Service”
(Operasi Bhakti) with the stated intentions:^2
. . . to transform the productive and progressive man­
power of the peasant class into a pillar of the revo­
lution by breaking down the archaic methods of agri-
11. Universitas Gadjah Mada, Fakultas Pertanian, Musjawarah
Operasi Bhakti I: Mahasiswa Tugas BIMAS S.S.B.M. tgl. 2 s/d 
3 September 1965 (Jogjakarta, 1965 ), p. 13.
12. Ibid., p . 4.
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culture that are traditional (instinctive) into ways 
of farming that are rational.
This task of service is not a pretext for putting 
oursdlves among the petani; we must be capable of 
giving them a realization and a consciousness in con­
sonance with the passion of the revolution.
For six months we will leave our school benches 
to plunge ourselves among the petani without counting 
gain or loss.
In closing, the conference issued ten directives including 
the following:13
*4. Students . . . will strive for the common goal
of . . . transforming the individualistic/traditional
petani into a cooperative petani, a gotong-rojong 
[mutual self-help] petani, and a rational petani. . . .
8. . . . With BIMAS . . . the koperta . . . will 
become a means of rubbing out the vestiges of capital­
ism and feudalism and all other forms of exploitation.
Bimbingan Massal S.S.B.M., 1965/1966
The year 1965 was a pivotal one for Indonesians. The tur­
moil which began in September in Djakarta spread throughout the 
country and ultimately led to the replacement of the Sukarno 
regime by a nNew Order.” It was also the year in which BIMAS 
was born.
BIMAS grew out of a series of meetings or seminars in 1965. 
The first meeting, held in Jogjakarta on July 3, was sponsored 
by Dirtara and attended by the heads of the three Diperta on 
Java, by the Deans of the Agricultural Faculties, and by a 
representative from the National Federation of Agricultural 
Cooperatives (INDUK KOPERTA). This meeting drafted seven in­
structions which formed the basic "compass” for the following 
year’s rice self-sufficiency program. The important points 
included changing the name of the program from DEMAS to BIMAS 
and determining that the program would cover 150,000 hectares 
and would mobilize all available students at agricultural high 
schools, agriculture-related academies, university faculties, 
and also cadre from the cooperative movement and extension agents.
In mid-July, President Sukarno formed a National Food Coun­
cil (KOTOE Instruction No. 46 of 1965), containing an Operational
13. Ibid., pp. 79-80.
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Unit for Food responsible for "mending, upgrading, and coordi­
nating" the mass intensification efforts of BIMAS. As a result 
responsibility for the implementation of BIMAS was transferred 
from Dirtara to the highest administrative level of the Govern­
ment. The purpose for the change was to guarantee that all the 
non-agricultural inputs (such as credit, transportation, and 
marketing) would be made available as required.14
In the middle of August, the major planning meeting for 
BIMAS- 1965/1966 was held in Djakarta. The participants included 
the Departments of Agriculture, Higher Education, and Transmi- 
gration/Cooperatives, twenty-two Deans of the Faculties of Agri­
culture, Forestry, Fishing, Animal Husbandry, and of the Teacher 
Training Institutes, the Bank (BKTN) and the INDUK KOPERTA. By 
an order of President Sukarno, the conclusions of this August 
meeting became the official directives for implementing BIMAS, 
and all Government organizations were instructed to follow them.15
1. Basic Policy. BIMAS is an extension tool for 
rapidly and massively raising production. By 1969/70,
BIMAS is to put into practice complete pantja usaha on 
all sawah cultivated in Indonesia. The koperta is to 
be given full support on all sides in carrying out 
BIMAS. The objective of BIMAS is complete national 
self-sufficiency, including fertilizers and pesticides.
2. Fundamentals of Implementation. In ketjamatan 
with DEMAS units, there will be ten to fifteen times 
as many BIMAS units in 1965/66 [than there were in the 
previous year]. Every other ketjamatan must have at 
least one unit. All inputs will be provided to units 
which are participating for the first time; in each 
subsequent year, every unit must become increasingly 
self-sufficient to the point where it no longer re­
quires programmed assistance to follow full pantja 
usaha. The koperta must employ full-time administra­
tors for the program.
3. Organization. As in DEMAS, executive commis­
sions will be formed at each administrative level with 
representatives of all organizations involved. In 
addition, each executive committee will be backed up 
by a committee of experts. At the local level, the 
petani in each unit are to be divided up into teams 
for soil preparation, fertilizer application, irriga­
tion, etc.
14. Note that this action amounted to a repetition of the KOGM 
system of organization in 1959 which was a failure.
15. Djatianto, BIMAS, pp. 152-156.
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4. Sampling. For evaluation purposes, sampling 
of yields must be done scientifically in accordance 
with instructions from the Expert Committees.
5. Choosing Units. Plots must be chosen which 
have maximum potential for yield increases, which are 
visible to non-participants which are representative 
of soils in the ketjamatan, which belong to people who. 
believe in the program and will follow it faithfully.
6. Improved Seeds. Fertilizer-responsive improved 
varieties must be used. Provision must be made for 
supplying such seeds to areas surrounding the units
as well as to the units themselves.
7. Organic Fertilizer. Chemical fertilizers must 
be supplemented by organic fertilizer as much as pos­
sible; to provide incentives for their use, contests 
will be conducted for the best results with organic 
fertilizer.
8. Processing and Marketing. These are as import­
ant as increasing production if BIMAS is to bring 
about a higher standard of living for the petani.
9. Becoming Self-sufficient. Participants in 
each unit must decide how to accumulate capital from 
the yield increases to make the koperta self-support­
ing.
10. Koperta Maturity.16 The koperta must become 
fully mature in order to reach the stage of Indonesian 
socialist agriculture that is based on gotong rojong 
while respecting the right of individual ownership.
Less than two months after the details of BIMAS 1965/66 
were settled, just as most students were preparing to leave for 
the villages, the "September 30th Movement" took place. In 
spite of the turmoil which followed, BIMAS was implemented.
The acreage target, in fact, was exceeded (158,000 ha. rather 
than 150,000 ha.), although there were only 2,789 units instead 
of the planned 3,000 units. Out of the 25 provinces, eighteen 
had BIMAS units and close to 1500 students were mobilized (less 
than half the students were from agricultural faculties). The 
yield increases were disappointing, however: five and one-half
tons per hectare in BIMAS as against three tons per hectare
16. In Indonesian jargon, the "maturity" (pendewasaan) of a
cooperative indicates its degree of effectiveness or level 
of development.
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outside BIMAS;17 18partly perhaps, because the social turmoil 
during the 1965/66 wet season had resulted in late planting and 
improper care during the growth period. The dilution of the 
extension effort and bottlenecks in delivering the inputs (in­
cluding credit), however, were probably more important factors.
BIMAS Programs, 1966 to 1968
Planning for the 1966/67 wet season began in April 1966, 
at a special BIMAS conference in Tretes, East Java. 8 It was 
decided at the conference that BIMAS in the coming wet season 
would cover 1.3 million hectares (up from 150,000 hectares in 
the previous wet season), including 300,000 hectares in a special 
program near Djakarta designed to fulfill the needs of the 
capital (.Progek Dewi Sri Djaja). In order to carry out a pro­
gram on such a massive scale, the conference called for the 
participation of all university students, not just those in 
agriculture-related Faculties.
In fact, the BIMAS program in 1966/67 was not carried out 
on the fantastic scale envisioned at the Tretes meeting. The 
acreage target only tripled from 150,000 hectares to 480,000 
hectares (in twenty provinces) and the actual coverage realized 
was slightly over 450,000 hectares. The number of students in­
volved increased from 1500 to 2500, and there were sharp in­
creases in the number of extension service and koperta workers 
assigned to BIMAS. In addition to the special project for 
Djakarta, there was a similar effort organized for the city of 
Medan in North Sumatra (.Progek Pangan Medan Djaja— on 50 ,000 
hectares). Another noteworthy innovation in the 1966/67 season 
was the contract awarded to the Swiss chemical consortium, CIBA, 
for aerial spraying 30,000 hectares of rice fields in South 
Sulawesi. The spraying was done on credit and repayment in kind 
was arranged by the provincial government.
The most significant change in BIMAS 1966/67 was the method 
of financing the program. The Tretes conference had proposed 
that financing be integrated with the operations of KOLOGNAS.
17. In BIMAS 1965/66 and all subsequent years, the Department 
of Higher Education no longer played a direct role in the 
planning or the financing of BIMAS. In 1965/66 BIMAS was 
funded by the National Food Council, Dirtara, and the Na­
tional Bank. (BNI Units I and II).
18. The dry season rice crop became involved in BIMAS for the 
first time in the 1966 dry season (April through September): 
more than 100,000 hectares in three provinces. Credit ar­
rangements were changed as detailed for 1966/67 BIMAS. No 
students participated in this season or any subsequent dry 
seasons.
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(Komando Logistik Nasional, the command responsible for purchas­
ing and distributing rice for the civil service and the mili­
tary). Certain funds in the national budget had been allocated 
to KOLOGNAS for the purchase of rice in 1967. Rather than using 
these funds directly for the purchase of rice, a part of them 
(30%) was transferred to BIMAS to finance the 1966/67 program 
with the provision that this credit be repaid in kind from the 
increase in production on BIMAS plots, up to an amount equal to 
the purchases planned by KOLOGNAS for 1967.1 9
The 1967 dry season BIMAS program was reduced from 100,000 
ha. to 12,000 ha., but these were divided among eight provinces 
rather than three as in the previous dry season. In the 1967/68 
wet season, BIMAS was not expanded significantly; the problems 
of rapid growth started to catch up with the program, especially 
the problems of credit repayment and extension personnel. Less 
than half of the credit extended the previous year had been re­
paid, and the non-agricultural faculties of the universities 
were no longer willing to send their students into the villages 
for six months. The actual acreage covered by BIMAS in 1967/68 
was 470,000 hectares. No data is available on yields.
By the 1967/68 season, the whole program had become rather 
confusing. One confusion was the distinction between BIMAS 
financed by the provinces and national BIMAS; another was the 
separate administration of projects like Dewi Sri Djaja and 
Medan Djaja. Still another was the inauguration of quasi-BIMAS 
programs: INMAS, short for intensifikasi massal> in which the
participants were responsible for their own financing; BIMAS 
Go go Rentjah, covering plots planted for dry rice cultivation 
that are converted to wet cultivation if sufficient rain is 
forthcoming; BIMAS Berdikari, where the inputs were financed 
either by provincial funds or by the farmers themselves; BIMAS 
CIBA, where the inputs were provided by the Swiss pesticide 
manufacturer, CIBA, on credit; BIMAS Bavu (New BIMAS), for pro­
moting the new "miracle” rice varieties PB5 and PB8; KORAN, a 
special development plan in Sumatra that was promoting the cul­
tivation of high yielding rice varieties; "Free" BIMAS, a pro­
posal put forward by the Governor of South Sulawesi to use the 
differential in the price of rice between Makassar and Djakarta 
to purchase fertilizer and other modern inputs for the program; 
not to mention a number of small, local programs sponsored by 
sugar mills, rice mills, manufacturing companies--such as P. T. 
Mantrust in West Java--and government or private estates.
The target for dry season BIMAS in 1968 was 424,000 hectares 
in eleven provinces, and estimates are that 50% of the target 
was achieved. 19
19. Djatianto, BIMAS, p. 174.
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The BIMAS Program, 1968
From 196M-/65 to 1967/68 BIMAS grew from 11,000 hectares to 
almost 500,000 hectares (out of six million hectares of sawah 
throughout Indonesia). This rapid expansion was the result of 
pressures from different directions. First the Government was 
anxious to eliminate the need to import rice. Second, for im­
plementing BIMAS, the Diperta received special funds from the 
center in proportion to the size of the BIMAS program in their 
respective provinces. Third, individual farmers and groups of 
farmers exerted pressure to expand BIMAS because they wanted to 
cash in on what they considered to be a windfall. The expansion 
of BIMAS was limited by the number of students available for 
guidance and the funds necessary to finance and administer the 
program. Demand for BIMAS programs far exceeded supply, which 
explains the appearance of the BIMAS-type programs mentioned 
earlier.
In this section, the highlights of BIMAS as it appeared in 
mid-1968 are reviewed.20 First, the BIMAS package is examined, 
along with two recent elaborations on the basic package, i.e., 
BIMAS Baru and BIMAS CIBA. Then in successive sub-sections, 
comments are made on the relationships between BIMAS and the 
koperta, the students, and the petani.
The BIMAS Package and 
Two Recent Elaborations
For each of the elements of the BIMAS package, there have 
been difficulties of delivery nin the right place at the right 
time." However, the most serious difficulties have arisen with 
the administration of credit.21 A thorough study of BIMAS 
credit alone would have required more time than was available 
for this entire study. Nevertheless, several features of the 
credit system stood out clearly enough to be commented on here. 
In the first place, petani frequently stated that not enough 
credit was available, i.e., they wanted to use more fertilizer 
than they could buy with the credit provided. In the second 
place, more than one-half of all credit extended to petani in
20. Generalizations about the program, unless otherwise indi­
cated, apply most directly to the province of Central Java 
where the bulk of field research for this study was carried 
out with the cooperation of Fakultas Pertanian, Universitas 
Gadjah Mada, Jogjakarta.
21. The responsibility for credit has been assigned to Unit II
of the National Bank (Bank Negara Indonesia, or BNI Unit II).
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Indonesia is provided by the private sector.22 In the third 
place, since dry season BIMAS 1966, only half of the credit 
available for BIMAS has been taken by BIMAS participants.
How are these apparent inconsistencies explained? Partly 
because, as a national policy, the BIMAS package is "selective," 
a petani can therefore opt for less than the full package. In 
practice, when the petani does not select the full package, he 
only takes credit for fertilizer (or part of the fertilizer), 
leaving unused the credit for transportation, soil preparation, 
cost of living, or, most disturbingly, pesticides. Another 
part of the explanation is that when the BIMAS credit is not 
available at the right time (or administrative complications 
have arisen), the petani is forced to turn to private sources. 
Also, BIMAS credit is only available for rice production and 
presumably a large portion of the private credit is supplied 
for other crops. In addition, the BIMAS package is the same 
throughout the nation although local needs vary greatly from 
area to area. In other words, the package fulfills the needs 
for average soil conditions, but the majority of farmers culti­
vate land with input requirements that either exceed or fall 
short of the mean.
Another noteworthy feature of the credit system is the prac­
tice of using land as security for credit. A question that needs 
further study is the extent to which the land guarantee prevents 
cultivators who do not own sawah from obtaining BIMAS credit 
(conceivably, in virtually all cases, the home of the cultivator 
is sufficient to guarantee the loan).
The most significant difficulty with BIMAS credit has been 
repayment. Ever since the beginning of BIMAS, there have been 
serious repayment problems, perhaps because the Government has 
never seized the land of any petani who defaulted on his pay­
ments. In 1966/67 BIMAS, the rate of non-repayment was excep­
tionally high. In Projek Pangan Medan Djaja, for example, out 
of Rp. 40 million credit supplied, only Rp. 10 million was repaid 
on time.23 The accepted explanation for the problem in 1966/67 
is that repayment in kind was a mistake. It was in this year 
that credit for BIMAS came from KOLOGNAS, with the provision 
that it be repaid in kind. As a result of this 1966/67 experi­
ence, Dirtara now supports repayment in cash as a matter of 
principle. One problem with repayment in cash is that the rate 
of inflation is usually higher than the rate of interest charged, 
so that less than the real value of the credit is repaid. Con­
sequently, repayment in cash introduces an element of subsidy 
into the BIMAS program, an aspect which deserves further study.
22. Government of Indonesia, LIPI, Draft Report, p. 36.
23. K. Sebajang, Projek Pangan Medan Djaja 1966/67 (Medan, 
1968), p. 35.
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The two major components of the BIMAS package, fertilizer 
and pesticides, have been handled with different degrees of suc­
cess. The determination of the recommended fertilizer dose is 
a process too involved to describe here, but the outcome is that 
the dosage recommended, on a nation-wide basis, is too large 
for the more traditional farmers and too small for the more pro­
gressive ones. The distribution of fertilizer has been the re­
sponsibility of the state-owned P.N. Pertani. In the early 
years of BIMAS, complaints about faulty delivery of fertilizer 
were commonplace. However, in the areas of Java where this re­
search was conducted in 1968, complaints about P.N. Pertanifs 
performance were rare, and the enterprise appeared to be moving 
forward vigorously with a program of building local depots.
As far as pesticides are concerned, critics of the BIMAS 
program agree that it has failed to spread the use of pesticides 
to an extent commensurate with their need or potential benefit. 
The most widely used pesticide has been a liquid spray, enderin.
A severe problem encountered in the use of all sprays has been 
the distribution and maintenance of sprayers. Many different 
kinds of sprayers have been tried, none of which have proven to 
be entirely satisfactory. Even aerial spraying has been tried.
In the summer of 1968, preparations were being made for 
two programs in the BIMAS family that are of special interest: 
BIMAS Baru and BIMAS CIBA. The value of the BIMAS Baru credit 
package is roughly 25% greater than the value of the "normal” 
BIMAS package (1968/69) because it includes a 50% greater dosage 
of fertilizer in order to maximize the yield from the new 
"miracle rice" varieties, PB5 and PB8, which the BIMAS Baru pro­
gram is designed to promote.24 The new varieties are short- 
stalk, fertilizer-responsive, fast-maturing varieties that have 
been successfully cultivated on a large scale in the Philippines, 
India, Thailand, and Vietnam. Preliminary trials in Indonesia 
indicate that the new varieties will double the yield increases 
which result from participation in BIMAS--the average per hectare 
increase in normal BIMAS is 1.6 tons of dry stalk padi; in BIMAS 
Baru the anticipated increase is 3.0 tons.25
BIMAS Baru is a logical elaboration of the BIMAS program, 
although questions do arise. Will the Government be able to 
multiply the necessary amount of seed and distribute it on time?
2M-. PB stands for Peta Baru ("new" Peta) and the designation is 
based on the fact that one of the genetic ancestors of the 
IR5 and IR8 varieties developed at the International Rice 
Research Institute in the Philippines is an improved Indo­
nesian variety called Peta.
25. Pemerintah Indonesia, Rapat Kerdja Pangan 1968. Program 
Produksi Padi/Beras 1969 dan 1970, Working Paper No. 2 
(Djakarta, 1968 ) , p . 8”!
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Is the recommended fertilizer dosage in the "new" package opti­
mum or less than optimum? How adaptable will the new varieties 
be in practice when cultivated widely; will the anticipated 
high yields materialize and will the varieties be resistant to 
local diseases? Will the necessities of cutting PB5 and PB8 
with a sickle rather than a knife and of threshing in the field 
rather than in the home, as traditionally done, constitute bar­
riers to their acceptance? Will the taste of the "miracle" 
varieties be acceptable to the Indonesian petani?
The second new member of the BIMAS family, BIMAS CIBA (also 
known as BIMAS Gotong Rojong or Company BIMAS), is something of 
a bastard, and faces most of the difficulties implied by that 
epithet. CIBA is the Swiss-based chemical consortium which 
carried out an aerial-spray project in South Sulawesi in 1966/67. 
The firm produces an insecticide called Dimecron 100 that is 
available in a concentrated form particularly suited for appli­
cation by aircraft. On May 2M-, 196 8 , CIBA and the Government 
of Indonesia entered into a contract which provided that the 
company would apply their insecticide three times to 300,000 
hectares of sawah (100,000 hectares in each of the three pro­
vinces of Java) in the 1968/69 wet season.26
The Government in turn agreed to pay CIBA US $4-0 per hec­
tare, or a total of US $12 million (subsequently raised to 
US $52.50 per hectare or US $15.75 million). In addition to 
the fertilizer and insecticide provided, CIBA agreed to pay the 
Government a Rp. 40 per hectare Management Fee to administer 
the program, to bear the cost of transporting the materials to 
the sites, to provide the Extension Service with a specified 
number of jeeps, motorcycles and bicycles, and to assume certain 
other minor costs.
To say that BIMAS CIBA is a bold undertaking is an under­
statement. There is some question, however, as to who is being 
bold: CIBA or the Government of Indonesia. In one respect,
CIBA in not exposed to any risk: a group of Swiss banks have
guaranteed hard-currency payment to CIBA. On the other hand, 
it is unlikely that CIBA is simply interested in short-term 
profit-making: the company has other interests in Indonesia
(pharmaceuticals and dye-stuffs) that would be jeopardized if 
BIMAS CIBA were to fail. Still, it appears to be the Government 
of Indonesia that has gone out on a limb. The difficulties 
added together are imposing: the ordinary administrative/logis-
tical problems encountered in Indonesia introduce a high degree 
of uncertainty into any undertaking; the petani who participate 
in BIMAS CIBA have no choice in the matter; the plots chosen 
must be adjacent to each other in a large block for aerial
26. The contract contains an option for carrying out the program 
on 400,000 hectares in the 1969/70 wet season, and antici­
pates the continuation of the program for a total of five 
years.
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spraying; the plots must be planted at the same time within any 
given block--maximum variance is two weeks--and with the same 
variety of seed in order for the spraying to be effective on 
the entire block; the borders of the blocks must be sprayed by 
hand; and the petani participating must pay for the project by 
surrendering as much as one-fifth of their net production. 
BULOGNAS will be responsible for collecting the payments, i.e., 
CIBA has no responsibility for repayment. This last difficulty 
is likely to be the most serious one.27
BIMAS and the Koperta
Indonesia’s emphasis on cooperatives is a natural outgrowth 
of her ideology, as formulated principally by Sukarno. In par­
ticular, cooperatives are considered to be an institutionaliza­
tion of the gotong-rojong concept that is central to the Indone­
sian ideology. Nevertheless, the development of cooperatives 
in Indonesia has proceeded at a very slow pace, as illustrated 
by the fact that there was no national law dealing with coopera­
tives until 1965 (Law No. 14). That law established three 
classes of cooperatives: consumer, producer and service. It
also set forth ten operating principles for cooperatives includ­
ing voluntary membership, equal responsibility for all members, 
and decision-making by a consensus resulting from mutual con­
sultation. With regard to agricultural cooperatives specifical­
ly, Law No. 14 of 19 6 5 restricted membership in koperta to 
owner-cultivators and agricultural laborers. Also, the koperta 
were organized in federations at each administrative level: 
pusat (core) koperta at the kabupaten (district) level, gabungan 
(combined) koperta at the province level, and induk (lit. mother) 
koperta at the national level. The Law also defined the activi­
ties of the koperta to include improving methods of production, 
research, planning, marketing, education, and information.28
27. Recent (July 1969) newspaper articles in Djakarta have 
described BIMAS CIBA in West Java as a complete failure.
At the same time, the BIMAS CIBA project will be continued 
in the 1969/70 wet season, and other foreign companies are 
undertaking similar projects (Hoechst from West Germany-- 
250,000 hectares; Coopa from Italy--150,000 hectares; A.H.T. 
--60,000 hectares; and Mitsubishi from Japan--25,000 hec­
tares). Figures from correspondence with Agriculture Minis­
try official, August 1969.
28. On December 18, 1967, Law No. 14 of 1965 was repealed and a 
new Law on the Basic Regulations for Cooperatives (No. 12) 
enacted. The important articles of the new law provide for 
the elimination of inactive and unqualified cooperatives.
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As was described in the previous section, the koperta were 
given a central role in the BIMAS program at an early stage 
(DEMAS 1964/65). In fact, the program was set up in such a way 
that the petani could not participate in BIMAS unless they were 
members of a primkoperta (primary agricultural cooperative).
This requirement sparked the formation of koperta on a massive 
scale that no prior effort had been able to achieve. Unfortu­
nately, at present, the vast majority of koperta exist in name 
only, serving no function other than to qualify members for 
participation in BIMAS. Out of the 17,000 primkoperta that are 
registered, there are literally no more than a handful that are 
exercising any initiative.29 30
There are conflicting interpretations of the relationship 
between BIMAS and the koperta. On the one hand, members of the 
cooperative movement frequently express their belief that BIMAS 
ruined the primkoperta. They argue that no cooperative can be 
viable unless it is created "from below." BIMAS forced the 
organization of koperta "from above" at such a precipitous pace 
that the preliminaries necessary to make the koperta viable were 
never completed. On the other hand, officials in charge of 
BIMAS tend to feel strongly that the koperta hurt BIMAS. These 
officials point out that the extension service, even supplemented 
by students, is not large enough to cover more than ten percent 
of Indonesia’s sawah thoroughly. The goal of self-sufficiency, 
however, requires that BIMAS cover at least 25% (i.e., the area 
that is double-cropped). BIMAS can only reach its goal, then, 
if the koperta in fact are capable of administering the program 
in most arenas. Since the koperta have proven themselves in­
capable of the task, BIMAS is unable to achieve its objective.
There is fairly universal agreement as to the reasons for 
the failure of the koperta. The following are cited most fre­
quently : 3 0
1. The peasants have no faith in the primkoperta 
because of early irregularities and because they see 
no tangible benefits accruing from membership.
2. The members are not morally/mentally prepared 
for koperta membership, nor do they have sufficient 
knowledge of the objectives and methods of the koperta.
29. The figure for registered primkoperta is for 1967. Pemerin- 
tah Indonesia, Rapat Kerdja Pangan 1968, Masalah Institu- 
tionil, Working Paper No. 5 (Djakarta, 1968) , p .
30. Universitas Brawidjaja, Fakultas Pertanian, Pengantar Pantja
Usaha BIMAS S.S.B.M. 1 9 6 6 - 1 9 6 7  (Malang, 1 9 6 6 j ^  chapter six; 
Samedi Sumintaredja, Peranan Terguruan Tinggi Dibidang 
Penelitian dan Pendidikan . . . ^Djakarta, n.d.), p. 17;
Djatianto, BIMAS, pp~ 1 0 5 ,  TT7T
For this reason, they do not exert any control over 
the activities of the leaders.
3. The leaders are not morally/mentally prepared 
to lead the koperta. In part, this is due to the low 
prestige accorded to koperta leaders in Indonesia. 
Normally, the koperta staff is unpaid, or receives 
only a nominal salary--which encourages irregularities.
An additional weakness in koperta leadership is inade­
quate training.
4. The higher levels in the koperta hierarchy fail 
to exert effective guidance and control over the 
primkoperta.
5. There are no manuals establishing practical 
guidelines for leaders and members.
6. The primkoperta lack capital and facilities.
A partial explanation for this shortcoming is infla­
tion: the high rate of inflation prevailing in Indo­
nesia seems to discourage the accumulation of capital 
by cooperatives as much as by businesses and individu­
als in general.
7. The koperta cannot compete with the local money­
lender as a source of credit. The moneylender gives 
credit without administrative formalities, on short 
notice, and for non-agricultural purposes.
In short, the koperta is known as "the bogeyman of the 
peasant."31 In spite of great expectations and arguments that 
the koperta is the institution most suited to the Indonesian 
setting for the development of agriculture, the koperta is not 
pulling its weight.
BIMAS and the Students
The use of students in development programs is not unique 
to Indonesia. However, there is no evidence to suggest that 
the use of students in BIMAS was inspired by the example of any 
other country. In fact, the origin of BIMAS as described ear­
lier offers convincing evidence that BIMAS is sui generis.
In order to avoid exaggerating the role of students in 
BIMAS, it should be pointed out that the students are not con­
sidered by all involved to be a permanent feature of the program. 
Rather the students are seen as temporary elements that will be
31. Djatianto, BIMAS, p. 106.
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withdrawn gradually as the koperta develop the capability of 
independently promoting increasingly high levels of agricultural 
production.
There is no space here to review the educational structure 
in Indonesia as it relates to agriculture. Suffice it to say 
that children begin elementary school at the age of seven or 
eight. Six years of elementary school are followed by three 
years of middle school and then three years of high school. 
Graduates of high school can pursue higher studies at vocational 
academies, teacher training institutes or universities. The 
first two have three-year curricula; universities have a five- 
year curriculum with the terminal degree considered to be the 
equivalent of a master’s degree. Only eighteen percent of the 
population has completed the six years of primary school.32 3
Below the university level, there are vocational schools 
for agriculture at both the middle school and high school levels. 
There are also Cooperative Academies and Agricultural Academies. 
No figures are available on the number of these schools, but 
they are certainly few and far between. It is worth noting 
here that the curricula for the primary schools and the general 
junior and senior high schools, even those located in rural 
areas, *do not presently include agricultural subjects.
Some basic data about students in higher education is pre­
sented in Table 1. In terms of our interests here, the import­
ant features to note are: the small proportion of students in 
agriculture--five percent; the large proportion of students in 
the first year--49%; and the small number of agriculture gradu­
ates .
There are three points to be made about the agriculture 
faculties as they relate to BIMAS. First of all, the curriculum 
devotes little time to agricultural development problems and 
village studies. Since the majority of agriculture graduates 
are expected to go on to careers in the plantations, the sugar 
mills, the Agriculture Ministry, the research institutes, or in 
teaching, it is assumed that they have no specific need for 
training in rural development.
Second, all students are required to perform six months of 
praktek umum (general practice) outside the university before 
graduation. It seems logical for students to fulfill their 
praktek umum requirement by participating in BIMAS. Although 
this may have been the original intention, in practice most
32. Soedarsono Hadiysapoetro, Bimbingan Massal, p. 11.
33. Figure for 1964/65, from W. Brand, "Manpower Situation in 
Indonesia," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, No. 11,
p . 62 .
Table 1
Statistics on Higher Education, 1967







Students in State Universities and Institutes
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psychology, sociology, public administration, 
public relations, literature): 52%
— Exact departments (medicine, pharmacy, biology, 





— Teacher training institutes 17%
100%









IV. Total Graduates, 1950-1967, State Universities and Institutes






Other 3 ,788 17
Total 21,832 100%
V. Estimated Graduates, 1967, State Universities and
— Assuming all sixth-year students and 5/6 of the 
fifth-year students graduate:
— Of which agriculture graduates number
(assuming the ratio of graduates in agriculture 





Source: Government of Indonesia, Department of Education and Culture,
Directorate of Higher Education, Report of the Statistics 
Team on Higher Education in Indonesia (Djakarta, 1967).
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students have found it necessary to perform praktek umum in 
addition to participating in BIMAS— thereby lengthening an al­
ready excessive course of study. In 1967, the Directorate of 
Higher Education instructed all universities to integrate praktek 
umum into the five-year curriculum, but in the middle of 1968, 
it was doubtful whether the faculties would in fact follow the 
spirit of the instruction.
Third, by the summer of 1968, enthusiasm about BIMAS in 
the-agriculture faculties was obviously rather low. IPB, in 
fact, refused to participate in 1967/68 BIMAS for a number of 
reasons, among them uncertainty about who was going to pay the 
expenses of the students and dissatisfaction with the excessively 
rapid expansion of the program. At other faculties, when manda­
tory participation in BIMAS was lifted, most students preferred 
to undertake their praktek umum in places more pertinent to 
their aims (i.e., plantations, mills, etc.).
Students who are nBIMASedn may or may not serve in their 
native villages. The only instance of students being sent 
specifically to their own villages as a matter of policy was in 
1965/66 BIMAS when political turmoil created a serious problem 
of security. Clearly different patterns have emerged in differ­
ent provinces: in North Sumatra, the practice has been to have
students work only within their suku (linguistic/ethnic group); 
in Central Java, on the other hand, students have been deliber­
ately sent to areas far from their place of origin. Sometimes 
students have been able to live with relatives in the villages 
or towns to which they are assigned. In general, however, the 
students have lived in the home of the village chief--which 
appears to be a satisfactory arrangement. Basic expenses of 
the students have been paid by the BIMAS program. In Central 
Java, in 1967/68, students received money for transportation to 
and from their site plus an "honorarium" of Rp. 1,300 per month 
(twice the basic salary of the sub-district extension agent).
Up to Rp. 1,000 went to the village chief for room and board 
and to a special fund to pay the expenses of monthly meetings 
of BIMAS students in the region. The payment of the "honorarium," 
however, was often late and occasionally less than prescribed.
It was interesting to observe that the female students partici­
pated as fully as the male students. The only concession made 
to their sex was the practice of stationing them in pairs (boy- 
girl teams were tried at first but proved to be unsatisfactory).
In the 1967/68 BIMAS, each student was responsible for 400 
hectares on the average, and there was little contact with the 
cultivators participating in the program. 3 * Normally, the 34
34. The data about students is based on a questionnaire completed 
in February 1969, by 41 male students of Fakultas Pertanian, 
Universitas Gadjah Mada, Jogjakarta, who had participated 
in BIMAS 1967/68 in Central Java.
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students communicated with the petani through special lectures. 
Most of their time was spent preparing and conducting these lec­
tures, participating in koperta meetings, assisting in the dis­
tribution of credit, seeds, and fertilizer, supervising pesticide 
application, and measuring yields at the time of harvest. Usu­
ally, the students were not able to work individually with more 
than 100 or 200 cultivators--roughly 20% of the BIMAS partici­
pants in their assigned area. Considering that the students 
were at their sites for less than 200 days, their work with 
individuals could not have been very intensive.
Surprisingly, the extension agents expressed no resentment 
that the students were being paid so much despite their lack of 
experience. In general, the extension services indicated that 
they did not expect the students to be very effective as teachers 
of new agricultural techniques. Rather, their significant con­
tribution consisted simply of their presence, which inspired the 
petani or exerted a "corrective psychological influence."35 
Elsewhere, the Government has explained its support of student 
participation in BIMAS by arguing that it builds character, 
trains the students to identify and solve problems, stimulates 
their imagination and creative thinking, and satisfies their 
appetite "for adventure in ideas and in action."36
It was also interesting to observe that the petani and 
local officials appreciated the efforts of the students. Al­
though the local people did not feel they had learned a great 
deal from the students, the prevailing sentiment was one of 
pleasure at the interest the students were taking in village 
life. Frequently, the statement was made that the students 
made BIMAS "lebih sempurna" (more perfect).37 On the whole, it 
appeared that the greatest impact of the students was in con­
veying the concept of pantja usaha in a meaningful way to the 
petani.
As for the students themselves, they listed five benefits 
of participation in BIMAS: the opportunity to translate theory
into practice and to learn where the two do not coincide; shar­
ing their knowledge with the petani; experience in working with 
petani for those whose careers will lie in that direction; ex­
posure to village life for those who have not been exposed to 
it and do not expect to be after graduation; and insight about 
diseases, local varieties of crops and local agricultural prac­
tices that is not available in the formal curriculum.
35. Pemerintah Indonesia, Rapat Kerdja Pangan 1968, Perkreditan, 
Working Paper No. 6 (Djakarta, 1968), p. 5.
36. Bachtiar Rifai, Mass Demonstration . . . (Djakarta, n.d.),p. 8.
37. However, there was a consensus that the participation of 
non-agricultural students (in 1966/67) was worthless.
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Many students who participated in BIMAS also reported that 
the experience caused them to reorient the focus of their studies. 
Occasionally, this meant switching from a technical specialty to 
the socio-economy department of the Faculty, which emphasizes 
extension. More often, it meant minor changes of interests, as 
for example, from rubber tree diseases to coffee plant diseases 
because during his BIMAS service the student met a coffee estate 
manager who offered him a job after graduation. The only other 
faculties.that have successfully organized the students to 
"turun ke desa" (descend to the villages) in keeping with the 
Three Aims of Higher Education are the medical faculties. The 
agriculture students take pride in their efforts to serve soci­
ety and find they can assume positions of leadership in the 
university as a result of the experience.
BIMAS and the Petani
On Java, rice farmers generally considered BIMAS to be a 
good thing, as evidenced by demands that the program be continued 
in areas where it has operated already or that the program be 
established in areas not yet "BIMASed." In a number of places, 
the petani did not want any part of it or had had enough of it. 
But these areas were the most progressive ones, from an agri­
cultural point of view, where the petani were accustomed to cul­
tivating in accordance with pantja usaha and where the private 
sector was able to supply the modern inputs required. For the 
petani in these areas, BIMAS was more of a nuisance than a 
benefit.
As was mentioned in the previous section, the petani appre­
ciated the participation of the students in BIMAS, although they 
did not claim to have learned a great deal from the students. 
Attendance at the lectures given by students was not remarkably 
good, but the reported reason was that most petani were occupied 
by other jobs (day labor, hair-cutting, cart rental, etc.) when 
they were not working in the fields. With regard to other 
aspects of BIMAS, the expected complaints were voiced about 
administrative inefficiency which caused the late arrival of 
fertilizer and pesticides, repayment in kind, high fertilizer 
prices, and low rice prices.
One of the cliches often heard in discussions of BIMAS was 
that the petani should be the "subject" rather than the "object" 
of the program. In other words, the petani should exercise con­
trol over the program, manipulating it to suit their needs in­
stead of being pushed around by the program. The underlying 
idea was that BIMAS could only be successful if the petani took 
an active part in the program and thereby established a "vested 
interest" in it. In spite of the rhetoric, there was no evidence 
that the petani were playing any more than a passive role; cer­
tainly targets for the program were derived from the desires of
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high-level planners rather than being aggregated from locally- 
determined objectives and capabilities. There were not even 
any institutional mechanisms through which the petani could par­
ticipate in determining which plots would be eligible for the 
program.
The most important question about BIMAS is its long-term 
impact on rice cultivation. The aim of the program is clear 
enough: to make available to the petani the wherewithal neces­
sary, to cultivate rice at the high level of production required 
to make the nation self-sufficient without special efforts on 
the part of the Government.
The success of BIMAS must be measured, then, not simply by 
the increases in rice production that take place, but also by 
the degree to which the petani can maintain high yields with 
their own efforts. In the first case, it is clear that BIMAS 
has succeeded in achieving substantial gains, but for the 
second, the evidence is less certain. When this research was 
begun, two specific points of inquiry were the pattern of par­
ticipation in BIMAS and the effect on yields when the petani 
left the program. Unfortunately, the research was not concen­
trated in any one location long enough to get satisfactory data 
on these points. A few general observations are made here, how­
ever, prefaced by the warning that the great variability between 
provinces, within provinces, and even among villages in a given 
district makes generalization very hazardous. The first obser­
vation pertains to the manner in which initial participation in 
BIMAS was determined. We have mentioned that the national tar­
gets were set with a view to maximizing the area covered given 
the restraints set by the funds, material, and personnel avail­
able. For all practical purposes, this national target was 
divided among the provinces through a bargaining process (the 
special management fee for BIMAS from the center being an im­
portant supplement to the funds budgeted for the Diperta by the 
provincial governments). In a similar fashion, targets were 
set by the provinces for each kabupaten, by the kabupaten for 
each ketjamatan, and by the ketjamatan for each kulurahan (vil­
lage). The village chief then had to decide which of his petani 
could participate in BIMAS, and the criterion of giving priority 
to those plots with the best potential for yield increases along 
with the minimum risk of crop loss was not always followed.
Often there were simply more plots in the village that qualified 
than there was credit available. It was also necessary to take 
into account that if there were mills in the vicinity, a portion 
of the village sawah had to be planted in sugar cane. Generally 
political factors seemed to prevail in deciding which petani 
participated in BIMAS, but precisely how was impossible to de­
termine .
The second observation pertains to the length of time (num­
ber of consecutive seasons) that individual petani were able to 
participate in BIMAS. In the academic discussion, there was a
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consensus that a petani must participate for three to five con­
secutive seasons before becoming berdikari.38 In practice, 
however, participation for that long occurred infrequently. In 
fact, as a matter of policy in East Java, petani were eligible 
to receive BIMAS credit only once. In Central Java, this was 
generally the case, not as a matter of policy but because the 
village chiefs were compelled to give everyone a chance to par­
ticipate. On an average, it is likely that the majority of 
petani participated for between one and two consecutive seasons.
The third observation concerns the behavior of yields when 
participation in BIMAS was terminated. Here the estimates were 
most contradictory. Curiously, students and local leaders 
shared the view that yields did not fall, but higher-level 
authorities believed that yields fell if the petani did not par­
ticipate in BIMAS for at least two consecutive seasons.39
The concluding observation relates to the specific question 
of how many petani were berdikari because of BIMAS. Again, due 
to the limited scope of the research, it is not possible to do 
any more than state a belief that BIMAS succeeded in making some 
petani berdikari who would not have been otherwise. In general, 
it should be noted that the achievement of this independent 
state has not been due to the activity of koperta. Rather, it 
has been a question of combining the availability of modern in­
puts (seeds, fertilizer, pesticides) with knowledge about their 
use— all within the context of favorable price relationships.
As a final note for this review of BIMAS as it appeared in 
1968, the differences between regions are stressed once again.
The preceding observations are most applicable to Java, specif­
ically Central Java. BIMAS in Bali has been conducted on a 
somewhat haphazard basis partly because there was no agricultural 
faculty in Bali until 1967, partly because the Diperta has been 
grossly understaffed, and partly because the Balinese are among 
the most progressive farmers in Indonesia already. In South 
Kalimantan, BIMAS was considered to have failed in the last 
three seasons, mostly because the petani are so backward— not 
Mfertilizer-minded," fearful that pesticides will kill their 
livestock, more interested in petty trade than in farming. In 
North Sumatra, BIMAS has not done well because of the lack of 
preparation, both of students and of petani, and serious diffi­
culties encountered in supplying fertilizer. Outside of Java, 
the only major rice-growing area making progress in raising 
rice production was South Sulawesi (which was not visited in the
38. Berdikari, an acronym from !Tberdiri at as kaki sendiri,n 
means ’^standing on one’s own two feet.!f
39. In my opinion, conclusive research on participation patterns 
and yield patterns would be more beneficial than research
on any other aspect of BIMAS.
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course of this research), and apparently BIMAS did not have as 
much to do with that province’s success as had the dynamism of 
local leadership.
Conclusion
It is too early to evaluate BIMAS thoroughly. Quite pos­
sibly, sufficient data will never be available to do the program 
justice. Nevertheless it does seem possible to discern the 
general tenor of the conclusions which would emerge. As suc­
cesses, BIMAS can count the involvement of students in develop­
ment and the spread of pantja usaha. It has also been responsi­
ble for some increases in production, but whether these have 
been worth the effort or not remains to be established by com­
prehensive cost-benefit calculations. What was the full cost 
of the program, including administrative costs and opportunities 
foregone? What was the value of the increased production plus 
the benefits of student participation?
The growth of the program may be interpreted as a positive 
indication of the Indonesian government’s ability to carry out 
development programs. At the same time, the sharpest lesson of 
the BIMAS experience is that the rapid expansion of a national 
program of this nature is likely to be counterproductive— once 
the point has been reached where leadership is so diluted that 
it loses its leverage. The most striking feature of the statis­
tics on BIMAS is the progressive decline of average yield in­
creases among BIMAS participants as the program grew (3.5 tons 
of stalk padi per hectare in 1964/65; 1.6 tons per hectare in 
1968/69--anticipated). Whereas the area of the program increased 
forty-fold in the first four years of the program (11,000 hectares 
to 470,000 hectares), the total increase in rice output attrib­
utable to BIMAS grew only twenty-fold (37,000 tons of stalk padi 
to 752,000 tons).
A balanced evaluation of BIMAS must also consider the al­
ternatives. First of all, it needs to be demonstrated that 
self-sufficiency in rice production is the proper objective for 
Indonesia at this time. There are economic costs involved in 
reaching that objective about which few people seem to be con­
cerned, as for example, the loss of relatively cheap P.L. 480 
rice in the event that Indonesia has the kind of rice boom re­
cently experienced in the Philippines. Even defining the point 
of self-sufficiency is a complicated issue: is domestic produc­
tion sufficient to maintain the present level of per capita rice 
consumption (approximately 90 kg. per capita per year) the point 
of self-sufficiency, or is that point only reached when the 1900 
level of consumption (110 kg.) has been restored? Second, it 
is necessary to determine whether price incentives alone can be 
effective enough in increasing rice production to make a national 
program such as BIMAS unnecessary. Or possibly (but improbably),
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the best approach to increasing production is to rely on private 
sector sponsorship of programs like BIMAS CIBA. Finally, some 
minor institutional modification of the koperta might be enough 
to transform the koperta from playing a passive role to playing 
an active role in agricultural development.
In any case, Indonesia’s attempt to achieve self-sufficiency 
in rice production in general, and the BIMAS program in particu­
lar, are fascinating and fruitful areas of study for scholars 
interested in Indonesia’s development. Preliminary estimates 
for the 1969 rice crop, issued by the Agriculture Ministry in 
August 1969, indicate that the harvest will fall short of the 
target for the first year of the new five-year plan, thereby 
casting some doubt on the likelihood of self-sufficiency in 
1973 as anticipated in the Plan. Nevertheless, history does 
not always repeat itself, and the sincerity of the present ef­
fort suggests that it will succeed where previous efforts failed. 
One of the most encouraging aspects of the BIMAS effort is that 
it was originally conceived by Indonesians and was tailored to 
the Indonesian setting rather than copied from another country 
or derived from some abstract model. To carry the analogy fur­
ther, while the basic pattern is sound, some modifications are 
necessary to make the program tjotjok (fit perfectly). In fact, 
the proper prescription probably involves reducing the program 
closer to the small size that existed when its success was so 
pronounced--at least until the administrative/logistical/techno- 
logical capabilities of the nation improve enough to support a 
larger program.
